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FALSE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY
*
 
False speech—what today is called “fake news”—is nothing new. 
Throughout this country’s history, issues concerning false speech have 
arisen. Early in American history, Congress, with many of the 
Constitution’s drafters and ratifiers participating, adopted the Alien and 
Sedition Acts of 1798.
1
 The law prohibited the publication of  
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the 
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress 
of the United States, or the President of the United States, with 
intent to defame . . . or to bring them . . . into contempt or 
disrepute; or to excite against them . . . hatred of the good people 
of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United 
States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for 
opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of 
the President of the United States.
2
  
The law was all about dealing with what was regarded as false speech. 
 The Federalists under President John Adams aggressively used the law 
against their rivals, the Republicans.
3
 The Alien and Sedition Acts were a 
major political issue in the election of 1800, and after he was elected 
President, Thomas Jefferson pardoned those who had been convicted under 
the law.
4
 The Alien and Sedition Acts were repealed, and the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 * Dean and Jesse H. Choper Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, 
Berkeley School of Law. 
 1. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Michael P. Downey, Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition 
Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 683, 692 (1998). 
 4. Id. at 694. 
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Court never ruled on their constitutionality.
5
 In New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, however, the Court declared, “Although the Sedition Act was 
never tested in this Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in 
the court of history.”6 
Exactly a century later, the nation was focused on “yellow journalism.”7 
The term was used especially in the mid-1890s to characterize the 
sensational journalism that used some yellow ink in the circulation war 
between Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph 
Hearst’s New York Journal.8 Yellow journalism was characterized by 
“prominent headlines that ‘screamed excitement,’ . . . ‘lavish use of 
pictures,’ . . . ‘frauds of various kinds,’ . . . Sunday supplement and color 
comics, . . . [and] ‘campaigns against abuses suffered by the common 
people.’”9 One of the most famous law review articles in history—Warren 
and Brandeis on the right to privacy—was written in response to the 
journalistic practices of that time.
10
 They decried the yellow journalists and 
gossip-mongers and criticized a sensational press that increasingly ignored 
the “obvious bounds of propriety and of decency.”11 
Again now, early in the twenty-first century, there is a focus on false 
speech. The phrase “fake news” has become part of the vernacular. Is this 
just a continuation of an issue that has been part of American history since 
its earliest days, or is it somehow different? In this Essay I want to suggest 
that the internet has made the issue different from times past and will raise 
difficult issues of First Amendment law. Specifically, in this Essay I make 
three points. First, the internet has significantly changed the nature of free 
speech, including the problem of false speech. Second, there is no overall 
principle as to how false speech is treated under the First Amendment, and 
there never will be such a principle. And third, the problem of false speech 
from foreign governments and foreign actors that emerged as a result of the 
2016 presidential election poses special difficulties under the First 
Amendment. 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).  
 7. Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters 
in Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1114–15 (2002) (discussing yellow journalism). 
 8. W. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, YELLOW JOURNALISM: PUNCTURING THE MYTHS, DEFINING 
THE LEGACIES 25 (2001) (describing nineteenth-century reporting practices). 
 9. Id. at 7.  
 10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890).  
 11. Id. at 196.  
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My goal in this Essay is more to identify issues concerning false speech 
than to offer solutions. It is important to recognize both how the problems 
are different than those that have been confronted before and the challenges 
these new problems pose under the First Amendment. 
I. The Internet as a Unique Medium for Communication 
The internet is the most important medium for communication to be 
developed since the printing press. In Packingham v. North Carolina, 
decided in June 2017, the Supreme Court spoke forcefully about the 
importance of the internet and social media as a place for speech.
12
 The 
Court declared unconstitutional a North Carolina law that prohibited 
registered sex offenders from using interactive social media where minors 
might be present.
13
 The Court explained that cyberspace, and social media 
in particular, are vitally important places for speech.
14
 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, explained: 
Seven in ten American adults use at least one Internet social 
networking service. . . . According to sources cited to the Court 
in this case, Facebook has 1.79 billion active users. This is about 
three times the population of North America. 
 Social media offers “relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity 
for communication of all kinds.” On Facebook, for example, 
users can debate religion and politics with their friends and 
neighbors or share vacation photos. On LinkedIn, users can look 
for work, advertise for employees, or review tips on 
entrepreneurship. And on Twitter, users can petition their elected 
representatives and otherwise engage with them in a direct 
manner. Indeed, Governors in all 50 States and almost every 
Member of Congress have set up accounts for this purpose. In 
short, social media users employ these websites to engage in a 
wide array of protected First Amendment activity on topics “as 
diverse as human thought.” . . . 
 . . . While we now may be coming to the realization that the 
Cyber Age is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot 
appreciate yet its full dimensions and vast potential to alter how 
we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
 13. Id. at 1733.  
 14. Id. at 1735.  
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forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and 
so far reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say 
today might be obsolete tomorrow.
15
 
Three characteristics of the internet are particularly important, especially 
for the problem of false speech. First, the internet has democratized the 
ability to reach a mass audience. It used to be that to reach a large audience, 
a person had to be rich enough to own a newspaper or to get a broadcast 
license. Now, though, anyone with a smart phone—or even just access to a 
library where there is a modem—can reach a huge audience 
instantaneously. There are great benefits to this, but also costs. No longer 
are people dependent on a relatively small number of sources for news.  
A half century ago, the Court unanimously held that the federal 
government could regulate the broadcast media because of the inherent 
scarcity of spectrum space.
16
 No longer is there such scarcity. The internet 
also means that false information can be quickly spread by an almost 
infinite number of sources. True information that is private can be quickly 
disseminated.
17
 There is even a name for it: “Doxing,” or publishing private 
information about a person on the internet, often with the malicious intent 
to harm the individual.
18
 The internet and social media can be used to 
harass.
19
 A study by the Pew Research Center “found 40 percent of adult 
Internet users have experienced harassment online, with young women 
enduring particularly severe forms of it.”20  
Second, the internet has dramatically increased the dissemination and 
permanence of information, or to phrase this differently, it has enormously 
increased the ability to access information. Take defamation as an example. 
Imagine before the internet that a local newspaper published false 
information about a person that harmed his or her reputation. The falsity 
would be known by readers of the paper and could be circulated by word of 
mouth. There could be great harm to the person’s reputation. But the 
newspaper itself would largely disappear except to those wanting to search 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Id. at 1735–36 (citations omitted). 
 16. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969) (upholding the fairness 
doctrine based on broadcast spectrum scarcity). 
 17. See LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL 
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 121–35 (2011). 
 18. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 53 (2014). 
 19. Id. at 35–55.  
 20. Marlisse Silver Sweeney, What the Law Can (and Can’t) Do About Online 
Harassment, ATLANTIC (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2014/11/what-the-law-can-and-cant-do-about-online-harassment/382638/.  
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for it on microfilm or microfiche. Accessing the actual story would be very 
difficult. 
Now, though, the defamatory story can be quickly spread across the 
internet and likely will be there to be found forever. It is enormously 
difficult, if not impossible, to erase something from the internet. The 
internet has the benefit of providing us all great access to information. As 
lawyers and law students, we can access Westlaw and all of the cases and 
secondary sources that would have required a trip to the law library when I 
was in law school. We can visit the great museums of the world online. We 
have access to unlimited information from a myriad of sources. But it also 
means that false information can be easily accessed and remains available 
in a way that was impossible before the internet. 
Finally, the internet does not respect national boundaries. Again, there 
are great benefits to this. Totalitarian governments cannot cut off 
information to their citizens. When the revolution began in Egypt, the 
government tried to stop access to the internet, but people with satellite 
phones could maintain access and, consequently, disseminate what they 
learned.
21
 The Supreme Court has estimated that forty percent of 
pornography on the internet comes from foreign countries, making any 
attempt to control it within a country impossible.
22
 Of course, as we saw in 
the 2016 presidential election and evidenced by Special Counsel Robert 
Mueller’s indictments, this also allows foreign countries and foreign actors 
a vehicle for trying to influence the outcome of United States elections.
23
 
This, of course, is just a brief sketch of how the internet has changed free 
speech. But my point, like the Court’s in Packingham, is that the internet is 
different from other media that exist for speech. The benefits are great, but 
so too are the potential costs, especially when it comes to false speech. It is 
easier to disseminate, easier to retrieve, and easier for those in foreign 
countries to send it to be read by those in the United States. 
II. The Lack of a Consistent First Amendment Approach to False Speech 
There is no consistent answer as to whether false speech is protected by 
the First Amendment. In some areas, the Court has found constitutional 
protection for false expression, but in other instances it has upheld the 
ability of the government to punish false speech. After reviewing some of 
                                                                                                                 
 21. When Egypt Turned Off the Internet, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 28, 2011), https://www. 
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/2011128796164380.html. 
 22. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004). 
 23. See infra Part III.  
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these cases, I argue that this is inevitable because analysis must be 
contextual and must be the result of balancing of competing interests, which 
will prevent a consistent approach to false speech. That is, the Court never 
will be able to say that all false speech is outside of First Amendment 
protection or that all false speech is constitutionally safeguarded. 
In some instances, the Court has emphatically declared the importance of 
protecting false speech. The most important case in this regard—and one of 
the most important free speech decisions of all time—is New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan.
24
 L.B. Sullivan, an elected commissioner of Montgomery, 
Alabama, sued the New York Times and four African-American clergymen 
for an advertisement that had been published in the newspaper on March 
29, 1960.
25
 The ad criticized the way in which police in Montgomery had 
mistreated civil rights demonstrators.
26
 There is no dispute that the ad 
contained false statements: It said that the demonstrators sang “My Country 
‘Tis of Thee,” but they actually sang the national anthem; it said that Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., had been arrested seven times, but it really was 
only four; it said that nine students were expelled for the demonstration, but 
their suspension was for a different protest at lunch counters; and the ad 
mistakenly said that the dining hall had been padlocked.
27
 Pursuant to a 
judge’s instructions that the statements were libelous per se and that general 
damages could be presumed, the jury awarded a $500,000 verdict for 
Sullivan.
28
 
The Supreme Court held that the tort liability violated the First 
Amendment.
29
 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, began by stating that 
the case was considered “against the background of a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials.”30 The Court explained that criticism of government and 
government officials was at the core of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.
31
 Most importantly, especially for this discussion, the Court 
said that the fact that some of the statements were false was not sufficient to 
                                                                                                                 
 24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 25. Id. at 256.  
 26. Id. at 256–57.  
 27. Id. at 258–59.  
 28. Id. at 256, 262.  
 29. Id. at 283.  
 30. Id. at 270. 
 31. Id. at 273.  
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deny the speech First Amendment protection.
32
 The Court explained that 
false “statement is inevitable in free debate and [it] must be protected if the 
freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . 
to survive.’”33 
Accordingly, the Court said that it was not enough that truth was a 
defense under Alabama’s libel law—requiring that defendants prove the 
truth of their statements will chill speech.
34
 The Court thus concluded that 
the First Amendment prevents a “public official from recovering damages 
for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves 
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge 
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”35 
New York Times is widely regarded as one of the most important First 
Amendment decisions in history because of its application of the 
Constitution as a limit on tort liability, because of its strong protection of 
political speech, and because of its protection of even false speech.
36
  
More recently, in a very different context, in United States v. Alvarez, the 
Court again recognized the importance of judicial protection of false 
speech.
37
 Alvarez involved the constitutionality of a federal law that made it 
a crime for a person to falsely claim to have received military honors or 
decorations.
38
 Justice Kennedy wrote for a plurality of four and concluded 
that the law imposed a content-based restriction on speech and thus had to 
meet the most “exacting scrutiny.”39 He explained that the government 
failed this test because it did not prove any harm from false claims of 
military honors and because the government could achieve its goals through 
less restrictive alternatives.
40
  
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. at 271.  
 33. Id. at 271–72. 
 34. Id. at 278–79.  
 35. Id. at 279–80. 
 36. See, e.g., Harry Kalven Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central 
Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 n.125 (describing New York 
Times v. Sullivan as the occasion for “dancing in the streets”). 
 37. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
 38. Id. at 715–16. 
 39. Id. at 715.  
 40. Id. at 725–26. 
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Most importantly, Justice Kennedy expressly rejected the government’s 
argument that false speech is inherently outside the scope of the First 
Amendment.
41
 Justice Kennedy declared:  
Absent from those few categories where the law allows content-
based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First 
Amendment for false statements. This comports with the 
common understanding that some false statements are inevitable 
if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in 
public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment 
seeks to guarantee.
42
  
Justice Kennedy further explained: “Even when considering some instances 
of defamation and fraud, moreover, the Court has been careful to instruct 
that falsity alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First 
Amendment.”43  
Most recently, in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Court 
considered a challenge to an Ohio law that criminalized making false 
statements about candidates during political campaigns.
44
 The Susan B. 
Anthony List, a political group that previously had been threatened with 
prosecution under the law, brought a suit for a declaratory judgment to have 
the law declared unconstitutional.
45
 Although the Court did not reach the 
merits as to whether Ohio’s law violated the First Amendment,46 the Court 
recognized the harms of such a prohibition of speech and noted “[t]he 
burdens that Commission proceedings can impose on electoral speech are 
of particular concern here.”47 It is hard to imagine the Supreme Court 
upholding a state law like Ohio’s that prohibits false statements in election 
campaigns.
48
 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, joined by Justice Kagan. He said that he 
would use intermediate rather than strict scrutiny and that the law failed this test because it 
was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 718. 
 43. Id. at 719. 
 44. 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014). 
 45. Id. at 2339.  
 46. The Court found that the plaintiffs met the standing requirements of Article III 
because they alleged a credible threat of enforcement and remanded the case on those 
grounds. Id. at 2343, 2347.  
 47. Id. at 2346.  
 48. On remand, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found 
the law to be an unconstitutional restriction of protected speech; the decision was then 
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/2
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Yet there are other contexts in which the Supreme Court has refused to 
provide protection for false speech. For example, it is clearly established 
that false and deceptive advertisements are unprotected by the First 
Amendment.
49
 The Court frequently has declared that only truthful 
commercial speech is constitutionally protected.
50
 Of course, the law is 
clear that the government can constitutionally prohibit making false 
statements under oath (perjury) or to law enforcement officials.
51
 The First 
Amendment is no defense to such charges. More generally, the Court has 
declared that “[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] 
they interfere with the truth-seeking function of the marketplace of ideas,”52 
and that false statements “are not protected by the First Amendment in the 
same manner as truthful statements.”53 Indeed, the Court has declared 
that “the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with 
reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.”54 
The Court’s seemingly inconsistent statements about false speech can be 
understood as reflecting the competing interests inherent in First 
Amendment analysis. On the one hand, false speech can create harms, even 
great harms. Speech is protected especially because of its importance for 
the democratic process, but false speech can distort that process. Speech is 
safeguarded, too, because of the belief that the marketplace of ideas is the 
best way for truth to emerge. But false speech can infect that marketplace 
and there is no reason to believe that truth will triumph. False speech can 
hurt reputation, and it is fanciful to think that more speech necessarily can 
undo the harms.  
But at the same time, there is great concern about allowing the 
government to prohibit and punish false speech. New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan was unquestionably correct when it said that that false “statement 
is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need * * * to 
survive.’”55 
                                                                                                                 
Supp. 3d 765, 775–79 (S.D. Ohio 2014), aff’d sub nom., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
814 F.3d 466, 476 (6th Cir. 2016).  
 49. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 563 (1980). 
 50. Id. at 566.  
 51. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720 (2012).  
 52. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988). 
 53. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1982). 
 54. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
 55. 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963)).  
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Also, allowing the government to prohibit false speech places it in the 
role of being the arbiter of truth. Justice Kennedy captured the dangers of 
this in Alvarez:  
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal 
offense, whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely 
audible whisper, would endorse government authority to compile 
a list of subjects about which false statements are punishable. 
That governmental power has no clear limiting principle. Our 
constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need 
Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.56 
The result is that it always will be impossible to say either that false 
speech is always protected by the First Amendment or that it never is 
protected by the First Amendment. Inescapably, the Court will need to 
balance the benefits of protecting the false speech against the costs of doing 
so. Such balancing is inherently contextual and will yield no general answer 
as to the Constitution’s protection of false speech. 
III. Foreign Speech 
There is now incontrovertible evidence that Russia engaged in a 
concerted effort to use speech, including false speech, to influence the 
outcome of the 2016 presidential election.
57
 American intelligence agencies 
recognized this soon after the election.
58
 In February 2018, Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller issued a thirty-seven page indictment charging thirteen 
Russians and three companies with executing a scheme to subvert the 2016 
election and help to elect Donald Trump as President.
59
 Mueller’s 
indictment details “how the Russians repeatedly turned to Facebook and 
Instagram, often using stolen identities to pose as Americans, to sow 
discord among the electorate by creating Facebook groups, distributing 
                                                                                                                 
 56. 567 U.S. at 723. 
 57. See, e.g., Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and 
Intentions in Recent US Elections, DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www. 
dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Indictment, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC, No. 1:18-cr-00032-
DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 914777; Kara Scannell et al., Mueller Indicts 13 
Russian Nationals over 2016 Election Interference, CNN (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www. 
cnn.com/2018/02/16/politics/mueller-russia-indictments-election-interference/index.html. 
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divisive ads and posting inflammatory images.”60 Russia’s efforts to 
influence the election primarily were through the internet and social media. 
There is understandable widespread outrage at the idea of Russia 
engaging in a concerted effort to influence the outcome of the 2016 
presidential election. Yet, it must be remembered that the United States 
long has been doing exactly this, using speech—including false speech—to 
try and influence the outcome of elections in foreign countries. Dov Levin, 
a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, identified eighty-one instances 
between 1946 and 2000 in which the United States did this.
61
 As one report 
explained,  
Bags of cash delivered to a Rome hotel for favored Italian 
candidates. Scandalous stories leaked to foreign newspapers to 
swing an election in Nicaragua. Millions of pamphlets, posters 
and stickers printed to defeat an incumbent in Serbia. The long 
arm of Vladimir Putin? No, just a small sample of the United 
States’ history of intervention in foreign elections.62 
Although condemnation of Russian meddling in the American election is 
easy, the underlying First Amendment issue is difficult. Obviously illegal 
conduct, such as hacking into the Democratic National Committee 
headquarters and subsequently disseminating the unlawfully gained 
information,
63
 is not constitutionally protected. But what about foreign 
speech that is legal and that expresses an opinion—even false speech? 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has said that the source of information 
does not matter for First Amendment purposes. In First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a 
Massachusetts law that prohibited banks or businesses from making 
contributions or expenditures in connection with ballot initiatives and 
referenda.
64
 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, concluded that the value 
of speech is in informing the audience. Any restriction on speech, 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Sheera Frenkel & Katie Benner, To Stir Discord in 2016, Russians Turned Most 
Often to Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/ 
technology/indictment-russians-tech-facebook.html. 
 61. Scott Shane, Russia Isn’t the Only One Meddling in Elections. We Do It Too, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/sunday-review/russia-isnt-the-
only-one-meddling-in-elections-we-do-it-too.html.  
 62. Id. 
 63. Raphael Satter, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats’ Emails, AP 
(Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/dea73efc01594839957c3c9a6c962b8a. 
 64. 435 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1978). 
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regardless of its source, therefore undermines the First Amendment. Justice 
Powell explained:  
The speech proposed by appellants is at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection. . . . If the speakers here were not 
corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence 
their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to 
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because 
the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. 
The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for 
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its 
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.
65
 
The Court relied on this in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission to hold that corporations have the constitutional right to spend 
unlimited amounts of money directly from their treasuries to elect or defeat 
candidates for political office.
66
 The Court stressed that the value of the 
speech does not depend on the identity of the speaker and held that 
corporate speech is protected not because of the inherent rights of 
corporations, but because all expression contributes to the marketplace of 
ideas. The Court wrote:  
The rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a 
speaker’s wealth is a necessary consequence of the premise that 
the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of 
political speech based on the speaker’s identity. . . . The basic 
premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its iteration, and 
constant reiteration, of the proposition that the First Amendment 
bars regulatory distinctions based on a speaker’s identity, 
including its ‘identity’ as a corporation.67  
On other occasions, too, the Court has declared that “[t]he identity of the 
speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected.”68  
But if this is so, why should it matter whether the speaker is a foreign 
government or foreign individual? Federal law prohibits foreign 
governments, individuals, and corporations from contributing money to 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 776–77 (emphasis added). 
 66. 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).  
 67. Id. at 350, 394. 
 68. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plurality 
opinion). 
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candidates for federal office.
69
 A federal court upheld this restriction on 
foreign speech, declaring:  
It is fundamental to the definition of our national political 
community that foreign citizens do not have a constitutional 
right to participate in, and thus may be excluded from, activities 
of democratic self-government. It follows, therefore, that the 
United States has a compelling interest for purposes of First 
Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign 
citizens in activities of American democratic self-government, 
and in thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.S. 
political process.
70
 
But can this be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s declaration that the 
identity of the speaker should not matter in First Amendment analysis? It is 
notable that the Court in Bluman focused just on campaign contributions 
and expenditures, declining to decide “whether Congress could prohibit 
foreign nationals from engaging in speech other than contributions to 
candidates and parties, express-advocacy expenditures, and donations to 
outside groups to be used for contributions to candidates and parties and 
express-advocacy expenditures.”71 
At the very least, it would be desirable to have disclosure of the identity 
of speakers so that people can know when the speech is coming from a 
foreign government or other foreign source. But this, too, raises First 
Amendment issues as the Supreme Court has held that there is a First 
Amendment right to speak anonymously. In Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Commission, the Court declared unconstitutional a law that prohibited the 
distribution of anonymous campaign literature.
72
 Justice Stevens, writing 
for the Court, stated:  
                                                                                                                 
 69. Federal law  
bar[s] foreign nationals—that is, all foreign citizens except those who have 
been admitted as lawful permanent residents of the United States—from 
contributing to candidates or political parties; from making expenditures to 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a political candidate; and from 
making donations to outside groups when those donations in turn would be 
used to make contributions to candidates or parties or to finance express-
advocacy expenditures.  
Bluman v. FCC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 284 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). 
 70. Id. at 288. 
 71. Id. at 292.  
 72. 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995). 
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The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of 
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social 
ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s 
privacy as possible. . . . Accordingly, an author’s decision to 
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or 
additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.
73
  
Moreover, Justice Stevens said that anonymity also provides a way for a 
speaker “who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not 
prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent.”74 
Wouldn’t that be especially true of a foreign government or foreign 
individuals who were trying to influence an American election? 
I also worry that the internet may make all of this First Amendment and 
legal analysis irrelevant. As the 2016 presidential election shows, foreign 
governments can use the internet and social media to influence elections. 
They can do so without their officials and agents ever entering the United 
States. It is unclear how the law can be applied to them. The internet gives 
them the ability to engage in false speech (and all other kinds of expression) 
with relatively little fear of legal sanctions. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately the question underlying this symposium is the question of 
whether there can be too much speech. The premise of the First 
Amendment, and especially court decisions interpreting it, is that more 
speech is inherently better. But if it is false speech, that assumption seems 
dubious. Speech is protected as a fundamental right because it has effects. 
But how should we think about it when the impact is harmful, such as with 
false speech? 
I also worry at how the internet and the ease with which it allows speech 
may be increasing the polarization within the United States. I believe that 
such polarization is the greatest threat to American democracy. In the 
twentieth century, the media played an enormous unifying function. People 
across the country watched the same movies, listened to the same radio 
programs, and saw the same television programs. Everywhere in the United 
States people got their news from Walter Cronkite or Huntley and Brinkley. 
This helped bring together a nation with enormous regional differences. But 
                                                                                                                 
 73. Id. at 341–42. 
 74. Id. at 342. 
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now, because of the internet, people see news that not only reinforces their 
beliefs but also—pointedly and purposefully—emphasizes our differences. 
The media is dividing, not unifying us as a nation. 
Like so much in this Essay, I do not have a solution. I still believe in the 
premise of the First Amendment—that more speech is better. But ever 
more, I realize that it is a matter of faith, and the internet may challenge that 
faith for all of us. 
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